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I. Introduction
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., a United States district court cal-
culated ranges of royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for
the use of patents that were essential to the H.264 industry standard for vid-
eo compression and the 802.11 (Wi-Fi) industry standard for wireless local
networking.' The standards-setting organizations2 (SSOs) had adopted pa-
tented technology, including Motorola's, as part of their standards, but only
* Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I
thank Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Lemley, Rosanna Lipscomb, Luke McLeroy, and John
Page for their comments. I also thank the participants at a conference on FRAND and
the Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface at the University of Texas School of Law
and a workshop at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. I thank Robert Lev-
ine for research assistance.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIO-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1-3 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). This opinion is headed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law" but does not formally separate factual and legal rulings. Id. at *1. It deals with
both factual and legal issues within divisions based on subject matter: (1) SSOs, (2) the
economics and mechanics of calculating reasonable royalties, (3) Motorola's patents in
each of the standards at issue, and (4) the actual calculation of RAND rates. Id. at *5-
101.
2 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) established the 802.11
standard; the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) established the H.264
standard. Id. at *1.
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on the condition that patent owners would charge licensees reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (RAND) royalties for standards-essential patents (SEPs).'
Motorola, claiming that Microsoft's products infringed its SEPs, had asked
for royalties equal to 2.25% of the revenue from sales of products like Win-
dows and Xbox that use the patents.' Microsoft immediately sued, claiming
that Motorola's royalty demand breached its contractual RAND commit-
ments, of which Microsoft was a third-party beneficiary.'
In an important opinion, Judge James L. Robart determined the RAND
ranges as a step toward resolving the breach of contract claim.6 The RAND
rates he reached were far below Motorola's original demand.' Judge Robart
presented his analysis in the form of a hypothetical bilateral negotiation be-
tween a licensee and a patent owner seeking royalties subject to a RAND
commitment.' In substance, he directly calculated RAND royalties, guided
by a widely held scholarly view of the economic functions of a RAND
commitment. In doing so, he closely examined the technology and the mar-
ket, relying on expert testimony, strong assumptions, and comparable royal-
Id. Most other organizations and authorities now add "fair" to RAND to produce
FRAND, but the terms are interchangeable. In this article, I will follow the usage of the
court in the case I am considering.
4 Id. at *2.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002-03 (W.D. Wash.
2012) (holding that Microsoft was a third-party beneficiary of an enforceable obligation,
but leaving open the calculation of the RAND royalty). Judge Robart had denied injunc-
tive relief, limiting Microsoft's remedy to a RAND royalty. Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202, at *7-8 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30,
2012). More recently, the court denied Microsoft's motion for summary judgment on its
claim for breach of contract. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR,
2013 WL 4053225, at *7-9 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that there were genu-
ine issues of fact on the questions of whether Motorola violated its duty of good faith
and fair dealing by its royalty demands or by seeking injunctive relief). See also Mi-
crosoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the block-
ing of German injunctions against Microsoft).
6 Microsoft, 2013 WL 4053225, at *3 (stating that the court determined "a RAND rate and
range to assist the finder-of-fact in determining whether or not Motorola had breached
its RAND commitments"). In the August opinion, the court granted in part and denied
in part motions for summary judgment by both Microsoft and Motorola on issues related
to breach of contract. Id. at * 19. There was later a jury trial on Microsoft's damage
claim. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 5373179, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2013). The court denied Motorola's motions for judgment as a
matter of law. Id. at * 16. A jury awarded Microsoft $11,492,686 in damages-for its
expenses in the relocation of a distribution center to the Netherlands because of
Motorola's efforts to seek an injunction in Europe-and $3,031,720 in attorneys' fees
and costs. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 6000017, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2013). Judge Robart later entered a final judgment on Mi-
crosoft's contract claim and the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
RAND issue, making those determinations immediately appealable. Id. at *6. Motorola
has appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit. Microsoft, 2013 WL 6000017, appeal
docketed, No. 14-1089 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2013).
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *4.
Id. at *14.
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ties, especially those charged by two patent pools he found to be comparable
with appropriate adjustments.
Judge Robart's opinion, the first judicial calculation of RAND royalties,
established starting points for analysis of the many issues posed by RAND
commitments. As one indication of its importance, another district judge
followed Judge Robart's approach to determine RAND rates for other pa-
tents essential to the Wi-Fi standard-this time, patents owned by a patent
assertion entity.' As another indication of the opinion's importance, a lead-
ing scholar has already argued bluntly that "Judge Robart's analysis is
wrong."'0 The analysis thus provides a useful occasion to compare its ap-
proach to other judicial efforts to control monopolistic prices.
A contractual RAND commitment leaves to the courts the task of decid-
ing what rates are reasonable"-in effect, regulating monopoly pricing.
Economists are ordinarily skeptical of any form of official price regulation. 2
Courts themselves often claim to be less well equipped than administrative
agencies to calculate reasonable prices." For example, the Supreme Court
has refused, claiming incapacity and an undue risk of unintended conse-
quences, to base the legality of price-fixing agreements on whether the pric-
es fixed were reasonable 4 or to prohibit excessive pricing by a lawful mo-
* In re Innovatio IP Ventures LLC Patent Litig., No. 1 1-C-9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) ("The parties agree that Judge Robart's methodology is appro-
priate for the court to use here to set a RAND rate in this case.").
o J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 931, 968 (2013).
" Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001-02 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
("Because the policies leave it to the parties to determine what constitutes a RAND li-
cense, when such a genuine disagreement arises . .. the only recourse for the parties is to
file a lawsuit in the appropriate court of law.").
12 See, e.g., W. KiP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 646 (4th
ed. 2005) (analyzing energy regulation). The authors conclude that "the imposition of a
binding price ceiling reduces social welfare by decreasing the amount exchanged in the
market" and "in light of the excess demand, how the good is allocated to consumers can
create additional welfare losses." Id.
' See, e.g., In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451, 457 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The nonjusticia-
bility strand [of the filed rate doctrine] recognizes that federal courts are ill-equipped to
engage in the rate making process, which does not depend on whether agencies actually
use their superior expertise."); Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2001)
(observing that the filed rate doctrine is based in part "on historical antipathy to rate set-
ting by courts, deemed a task they are inherently unsuited to perform competently").
14 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) ("[I]n the absence of
express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction making the
difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend up-
on so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable-a determination which can be
satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a
choice between rival philosophies."); see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (observing that if "the reasonableness of prices" were to "be-
come an issue in every price-fixing case.. . the Sherman Act would soon be emasculat-
ed; its philosophy would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system of free
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nopolist." Courts rarely mandate low prices as a remedy for proven monop-
olization.16
However, courts do regularly calculate overcharges to purchasers as an-
titrust injuries attributable to instances of price fixing or monopolization."
This article compares Judge Robart's RAND analysis, stripped of its bar-
gaining language, to these determinations of antitrust injury and damages.
Microsoft involved only a claim for breach of contract." The determination
of the RAND ranges was a step in the determination of liability-whether a
competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which its framers intended"); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898) (holding that a bid-
rigging association, "however reasonable the prices they fixed, however great the com-
petition they had to encounter, and however great the necessity for curbing themselves
by joint agreement from committing financial suicide by ill-advised competition, was
void at common law, because in restraint of trade, and tending to a monopoly").
" See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) ("The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innova-
tion and economic growth."). As Judge Easterbrook put it, "the antitrust laws do not
deputize district judges as one-man regulatory agencies." Chi, Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship
v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996).
6 William H. Page, Mandatory Contracting Remedies in the American and European Mi-
crosoft Cases, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 787, 800-01 (2009) (describing how courts mandated
information disclosure rather than mandating prices); Case T- 167/08, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm'n, 2012 E.C.R. 243 (evaluating Microsoft's proposed license agreements for
compliance with a previous order to make interoperability information available on
RAND terms); William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncer-
tain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105,
1106 n.9 (1989) (citing Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 413-18
(1945)) ("A second form of remedy with structural implications in monopolization liti-
gation is compulsory licensing of property rights such as patents, sometimes on a royal-
ty-free basis."). In several other instances, consent orders have required royalty-free li-
censing. E.g., William E. Kovacic, supra (citing In re Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.T.C. 538,
546-52 (1980) and In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373-83 (1975)). In Microsoft, the
final judgments required Microsoft to make the communications protocols in Windows
available on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, but Microsoft voluntarily chose to
suspend all royalties. See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Measuring Compli-
ance with Compulsory Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 248-49 (2009) (discussing Microsoft's royalty holiday and its in-
definite extension).
1 See infra Part IV.
18 Motorola brought a parallel patent infringement action, but the court stayed those pro-
ceedings pending resolution of the FRAND issues. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 6000017, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2013). In enter-
ing final judgment on the contract claims and certifying them for appeal, Judge Robart
noted that the contract and patent actions "have been consolidated for all purposes" and
raise issues that "are 'substantially' the same." Id. at *4. Consequently, the parallel
claims and counterclaims "need only be decided once; after appeal, the mirror image
claim or counterclaim can be dismissed as moot or otherwise disposed of. Accordingly,
the court declines to certify any of the duplicative RAND claims in the patent action."
Id.
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breach of the RAND commitment occurred-rather than a step in the deter-
mination of damages.19 Nevertheless, the calculation of a RAND rate is par-
allel in theory, structure, and practice to the calculation of damages for an
illegal overcharge under a standard of antitrust injury. Both exercises,
moreover, have the goal of creating incentives that enhance social welfare.
Paradoxically, this analysis may actually limit the role of antitrust enforce-
ment in the RAND context. Standard-setting and RAND requirements raise
antitrust issues,2 0 but if contract enforcement can protect the antitrust inter-
est, even by drawing insights from antitrust law and economics, then anti-
trust enforcement becomes correspondingly less necessary or appropriate.
The next part of this article describes the economic function of the
RAND mechanism. It then shows in Part III how Judge Robart interpreted
the RAND requirement and applied it to Motorola's SEPs. Part IV com-
pares his analysis to the calculation of overcharges caused by monopolistic
exclusion.
II. RAND in Theory
The RAND commitment is ambiguous. 2 ' For example, the SSOs for the
802.11 and H.264 standards "declined to provide a definition of what consti-
tutes RAND terms" and "do not attempt to determine what constitutes a rea-
sonable royalty rate."22 Some argue that this ambiguity is a serious flaw in
the RAND mechanism 23 and have proposed mechanisms to better assure that
royalties for SEPs are optimal.24 Others argue that the generality of the
19 Id. at *3.
20 See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007); see also George S. Cary et al., The
Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 924 (2011) (arguing that antitrust is the preferable regulatory re-
gime for controlling hold-up by SEPs); Joseph Kattan, FRAND Wars and Section 2, 27
ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 30, 32 (arguing that breach of a FRAND commitment may
amount to monopolization even without deception of the SSO).
21 See Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, at *25
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) ("The paradox of RAND licensing is that it requires a patent
holder to offer licenses on reasonable terms, but it offers no guidance over what is rea-
sonable."); Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminato-
ry (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 5 (2005) ("[T]here are no generally agreed tests to determine whether a particular
license does or does not satisfy a RAND commitment.").
22 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
23 Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Pa-
tent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 52 n.23 (2013) (collecting authorities emphasiz-
ing the ambiguity of FRAND and RAND terms).
24 See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents 4 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19664, 2013), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl9664 (arguing that FRAND limits are likely ineffective
and proposing instead a "structured price commitment process" in which, "after a dis-
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RAND commitment is unavoidable because of practical 25 and antitrust26 im-
pediments to SSOs establishing more specific price constraints.
Although ambiguous, the RAND commitment can impose real con-
straints because, like any standard of reasonableness, it draws meaning from
its purpose. 27 For example, if a court requires an antitrust offender to charge
reasonable prices as a remedy, the meaning of the requirement depends on
the nature of the offense. Firms have sometimes agreed in consent decrees
to offer royalty-free licenses, implicitly acquiescing in the determination that
only a price of zero is reasonable. In the European case on Microsoft's
abuse of dominance, a remedy requiring Microsoft to charge a reasonable
royalty for its communications protocols meant that the royalty should "re-
flect only the possible intrinsic value of the information in question, and ex-
clude the strategic value stemming from the mere ability it affords to in-
teroperate with Microsoft's operating systems." 28 The intrinsic value of the
technology, including trade secrets, depended entirely on its innovative
character29 and not on its secrecy, which was strategic.30
covery phase, IP holders non-cooperately [sic] announce price caps on their offerings"
to establish an "ex-ante competitive benchmark").
2 Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing
and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 370 (2007) (arguing that the RAND
commitment is not too vague, but instead "is appropriately open-textured, given that par-
ticipants in the standard-setting process do not yet know the contours of the standard that
will emerge, or how the as-yet-unknown patents essential to the standard should be val-
ued in the standard-based market that develops").
2 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13 (noting expert testimony that SSOs fear antitrust
liability for setting prices ex ante); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 119, 142 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) ("[A]ntitrust concerns have led
[S SO] to steer clear of such ex ante competition, on the grounds that their job is merely
to set technical standards, not to get involved in prices, including the terms on which in-
tellectual property will be made available to other participants. The ironic result has
been to embolden some companies to seek substantial royalties after participating in
formal standard setting activities.").
27 As the Supreme Court observed long ago, the meaning of reasonableness "varies in the
different fields of the law, because it is used as a convenient summary of the dominant
considerations which control in the application of legal doctrines." United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
28 Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, Celex No. 62008TJ0167, 30
(June 27, 2012) (EUR-Lex), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsfcelex=
62008TJ0167&langl=en&type=TXT&ancre.
29 Id. 1 3 1.
30 Id. 143-144 ("[I]n the absence of innovation, secrecy by itself represents only strate-
gic value for a licensee, while fixed development costs are not ... a correct basis for
valuing intellectual property."). According to the court, this interpretation did not weak-
en legal protection for trade secrets generally; it only remedied a specific violation. Id.
150 ("Contrary to what has been argued by Microsoft, the effect, in the context of this
case, of assessing the innovative character of the technologies covered by the contested
decision by reference to novelty and inventive step is not to extinguish generally the
value of intellectual property rights, trade secrets or other confidential information or, a
fortiori, to make innovative character a precondition for a product or information to be
186 [Vol. 22:181
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The RAND commitment in collective standard-setting also serves pur-
poses that shape its meaning: to foster optimal adoption of the standard by
deterring hold-up and royalty stacking." First, consider hold-up. A stand-
ard enables and promotes interoperability and innovation in high technology
markets, but also gives the included technologies, including SEPs, a degree
of monopoly power, which increases as more firms adopt the standard. It
also may give SEP owners the opportunity to exploit firms that make sunk
investments in the technologies embodied in the standard." According to
the most widely held theory, a RAND commitment limits the patent owner
to the royalty it would have received apart from the monopoly power the
owner acquired by inclusion of its intellectual property in an industry stand-
ard.33 Before inclusion in the standard, the technology likely had to compete
with substitutes. 34 After inclusion in the standard, the technology's owner
should keep whatever advantage it had over substitutes ex ante. Conse-
quently, the patent owner is entitled to the incremental value that the patent-
ed technology offered over the next-best alternative technology immediately
before the SSO adopted the standard. 35 The patent owner is not entitled to
covered by such a right or to constitute a trade secret in general."). For judicial methods
of valuing intangibles in the tax context, see Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Be-
holder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV.
79, 103 (2008) (criticizing the implementation of the arms-length principle as a basis for
valuing intangibles for tax purposes).
* Shapiro, supra note 26, at 140 ("The essence of cooperative standard setting is not the
sharing of risks associated with specific investments, or the integration of operations, but
rather the contribution of complementary intellectual property rights and the expression
of unified support to ignite positive feedback for a new technology."); see also Dennis
W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & EcON. 531, 544 (2013); Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and
Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns Into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard
Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583, 597 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights
and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002); David J.
Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913,
1953 (2003).
32 Lemley, supra note 31, at 1893.
3 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 22-23 (2011).
34 Brief of Amici Curiae the Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers, Inc. et al. in
Support of Neither Party at 22, Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d
Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4292) ("[T]here certainly can be and usually are competing technol-
ogies before the standard is adopted-and thus competition for inclusion in the stand-
ard."), quoted in Kattan, supra note 20, at 31.
* FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 33, at 23 ("Courts should cap the royalty at the incre-
mental value of the patented technology over alternatives available at the time the stand-
ard was chosen."); see also Cary et al., supra note 20, at 915 (describing ex ante poli-
cies). Gregory Sidak argues that Judge Robart's measure is inconsistent with an IEEE
bylaw that provides that "a patent claim is essential if 'there was no commercially and
technically feasible non-infringing alternative' for the patent at issue 'at the time of the
[proposed] IEEE Standard's approval."' Sidak, supra note 10, at 981 (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws § 6.1 (Dec. 2012)). He continues, "by
2014] 187
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hold up a licensee3 6 by exploiting the market power attributable either to the
standard itself or to sunk investments that licensees make in the technology
in order to comply with the standard.37 Hold-up reduces social welfare be-
cause it deters efficient investments in technologies covered by industry
standards and inhibits efficient adoption of a technologically superior stand-
ard.
The incremental-value standard suggests that if there are two technolo-
gies ex ante that serve the needs of the standard equally, the RAND royalty
for the chosen SEP should reflect only licensing costs, including opportunity
costs, but economic profit should be zero. This outcome is obvious if the al-
ternative technology is in the public domain. One might argue that this out-
come should hold even if the alternative technology is patented because "the
two patent holders would negotiate the price down to effectively zero (ignor-
ing the cost of implementing the alternatives) because both desire to have
their technology incorporated into the standard, and both know that their
technology will be worth practically nothing if it is not adopted into the
standard."" One court found such a result to be an implausible outcome of
real-world bargaining or one that, if adopted as a measure of the RAND roy-
alty, might deter future investment in innovative technology.3 9 Nevertheless,
in principle, the profit-component RAND royalty for SEPs with perfect sub-
stitutes ex ante might well be zero without undermining incentives to invest
definition, one cannot apply the ex ante incremental value rule to determine the value of
or FRAND royalties for patents essential to IEEE standards because there are, at the rel-
evant moment, no non-infringing substitutes for the patents over which to calculate in-
cremental value. Judge Robart, however, assumed that there are substitutes at the time
of standard adoption, indeed so many compelling substitutes that the chosen technology
makes only a small incremental contribution to the value of the standard over the contri-
bution that the runnerup technology would have made if it had been chosen instead." Id.
In this passage, Sidak interprets the IEEE bylaw to mean that technology is essential to a
standard only if there were no alternative technologies before the adoption of the chosen
technology into the standard. A better interpretation is that the technology is essential to
the standard if, for a firm seeking to comply with the standard, there were no non-
infringing alternative technologies immediately after the chosen technology was includ-
ed in the standard, regardless of how many alternative technologies were available ex
ante for possible inclusion in the standard.
3 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("The purpose
of the FRAND requirements ... is to confine the patentee's royalty demand to the value
conferred by the patent itself as distinct from the additional value-the hold-up value-
conferred by the patent's being designated as standard-essential.").
3 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (defining hold-up as the "ability of a holder of an SEP to demand
more than the value of its patented technology and to attempt to capture the value of the
standard itself'); Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Pa-
tent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 892 n.9 (2011).
3 In re Innovatio IP Ventures LLC Patent Litig., No. I1 -C-9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (summarizing the expert testimony of Dr. Gregory Leonard).
39 Id
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because every investor in technology must take account of the risk that oth-
ers' innovative efforts will render its own technology valueless.
There is one important caveat. The ex ante standard excludes hold-up
from RAND but does not necessarily exclude consideration of the contin-
gent value of the patent to the standard. As Thomas Cotter has noted, patent
owners and licensees often agree to running royalties based on the licensee's
actual use of the patent because of difficulties in estimating the future value
of the patent and concerns about efficient input pricing in future production
by the licensee.4 0 Courts evaluating royalties under a RAND standard must
therefore distinguish hold-up from the value of the patent's contribution to
the standard and to the licensee.
Economists also agree that a RAND royalty should prevent royalty
stacking, which occurs if owners of strongly complementary SEPs individu-
ally charge profit-maximizing royalties to an implementer.4 1 Royalty stack-
ing poses the following Cournot complements or "anti-commons" problem:
in pursuing their individual self-interests, the owners of complementary pa-
tents impose external costs on one another, inefficiently reducing demand
for one another's products by increasing the price of and reducing the output
of downstream standards-compliant products.4 2 The sum of the stacked roy-
alties to the implementer is higher than a single royalty that would by
charged by a monopolist who controlled both complementary patents. There
are many opportunities for royalty stacking when a single high-technology
product implicates hundreds of standards with thousands of complementary
SEPs, many with monopoly power.4 3
III. RAND Measures in Microsoft v. Motorola
In Microsoft, Judge Robart endorsed, in principle, the economic ra-
tionale for RAND outlined above." This part of the article will examine the
criteria he adopted and the reasons he gave for them. It will then show how
he applied the criteria to the two standards at issue in the case. The next part
40 Thomas F. Cotter, Comments on Sidak, Part 3: Should a FRAND Royalty be Higher
than a Reasonable Royalty?, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES (Dec. 18, 2013, 4:39 AM),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/12/comments-on-sidak-part-3-
should-frand.html.
41 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *11- 12; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Pa-
tent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991, 2013 (2007).
42 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2013-14 (describing the inefficiencies associ-
ated with Cournot complements and double marginalization).
43 Kattan, supra note 20, at 31.
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10-12. In a more recent decision, another court
acknowledged the centrality of hold-up and royalty stacking in the RAND calculus but
insisted that any contentions that a proposed royalty was unreasonable on either ground
be supported by evidence. Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013
WL 4046225, at *25-26 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (finding a royalty proposal reasonable
because defendants "failed to present any evidence of actual hold-up or royalty stack-
ing").
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will argue that his analysis can be understood in terms of the economics of
antitrust damages.
A. Formulating the Measures
Microsoft argued that the court should calculate "the incremental value
of the technology compared to the alternatives that could have been written
into the standard" 4 5-invoking the theoretical principle that a RAND royalty
should exclude the hold-up value attributable to the patent's inclusion in a
standard. Judge Robart found that standard appropriate in theory, but diffi-
cult for courts to implement because substituting one patent for another in a
standard may change the standard's performance in multiple ways.46 In
form, he endorsed Motorola's suggestion that he should conduct a hypothet-
ical bilateral negotiation between Microsoft and Motorola to identify a rea-
sonable royalty.47 He pointed to the fifteen Georgia-Pacific4 8 factors courts
have long used to determine damages for patent infringement, which assume
a hypothetical bilateral negotiation based on the value of a patent in its real-
world market.49
The Georgia-Pacific factors and their bargaining framework are prob-
lematic even in the non-RAND context. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro
note that the bargaining framework is a distraction because the parties obvi-
ously did not agree.o The substance of the analysis, such as it is, lies in the
factors themselves. Lemley and Shapiro distill the fifteen Georgia-Pacific
factors to three: "the significance of the patented invention to the product
45 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13.
46 Id.; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Rethinking RAND: SDO-Based Approaches to Patent
Licensing Commitments, Int'l Telecomm. Union [ITU] Patent Roundtable, at 8-9 (Ge-
neva Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2159749 (noting that few SEP owners negotiate royalties before the adop-
tion of a standard, in part because of uncertainties about the future market).
47 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *14; cf Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Stand-
ard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent-Hold Up, Royalty
Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 114 (2007) ("'Fair
and reasonable' licensing terms ... consist of those terms determined through fair, bilat-
eral negotiations between individual IPR owner and standard adopter in accordance with
the market conditions prevailing at the time of such negotiations.").
48 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *15 (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)); see, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta
Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 76 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
501 F.3d 297, 314 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007); Geradin & Rato, supra note 47, at 120.
'9 See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *15 (observing that courts have "experience in
conducting hypothetical bilateral negotiations to frame the reasonable royalty inquiry in
patent infringement cases under the Georgia-Pacific framework"). Commentators have
suggested using the Georgia-Pacific factors to evaluate FRAND obligations. Id. at *16
(citing Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for
Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments,
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 673 (2007)).
o Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2019 (observing that the negotiation is "counterfac-
tual in important respects").
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and to market demand, the royalty rates people have been willing to pay for
this or other similar inventions in the industry, and expert testimony as to the
value of the patent."" Even in this reduced form, the factors provide little
guidance because they identify categories of evidence, but provide "no over-
riding principle by which to quantify and hence to weigh conflicting indica-
tors."52
Judge Robart modified the Georgia-Pacific factors to assure that his
hypothetical negotiation would not result in hold-up or royalty stacking, the
twin concerns of the economic analysis of RAND.5 3 In doing so, he changed
the factors so radically that the bilateral negotiation framework lost whatever
analytical significance it might have had. Parties in the modified negotia-
tion, he asserted, "would consider the RAND commitment and its purposes,"
like the purpose of promoting "widespread adoption of the standard through
avoidance of holdup and stacking."54 For example, they would exclude the
hold-up value from the royalty by considering the SEPs' contribution to the
licensee's sales, their relative importance to the standard,"5 and the alterna-
tive technologies that the SSO could have used in the standard.5' They
would avoid stacking by considering "other SEP holders and the royalty rate
that each of these patent holders might seek from the implementer based
[on] the importance of these other patents to the standard and to the imple-
menter's products."" When considering comparable royalties, they would
look only to royalties in licenses of RAND-committed patents,58 so rates
1 Id. at 2018-19.
52 Alan Devlin, Improving Patent Notice and Remedies: A Critique of the FTC's 2011 Re-
port, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 539, 565 (2012); see also John C. Jarosz &
Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages:
The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 771 (2013) (stating that the
Federal Trade Commission, practitioners, and academics are all studying damage calcu-
lations in patent cases and proposing various fixes for calculating royalties).
5 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *18-20.
5 Id. at *20. Judge Robart noted the need to "mitigate the risk of patent hold-up that
RAND commitments are intended to avoid." Id. at *12. He noted later in the opinion,
with respect to stacking, that ninety-two companies own SEPs, some very important, for
the 802.11 and H.264 standards. Id. at *52. If each SEP owner took a royalty rate simi-
lar to what Motorola asked, the sum of the royalties would exceed the selling price of
the Xbox. Id. at *73. At that stage in the litigation, Motorola had reduced its demand to
a figure between 1.15% and 1.73% of end-product sales. Id. at *72-73.
* Id. at * 18-19. The court also excluded consideration of the value of the standard under
the tenth and eleventh factors, which look to the benefits of the patent to the infringer
and the extent to which the infringer is using the patent. Id. at *19. It also considered
the standard in comparing the relative value of the patent to unpatented elements of the
alleged infringer's product. Id.
56 Id.
5 Id at *20.
58 Id. at * 19 (noting that the court also eliminated consideration of whether the patent own-
er had preserved its monopoly by restricting licensing because under a RAND commit-
ment the patent owner must license its patents to every implementer on reasonable
terms).
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Motorola had actually reached in bilateral negotiations with licensees not
subject to RAND obligations were irrelevant. 9 Finally, Microsoft would
take account of the fact that a RAND royalty must be high enough "to in-
duce the creation of valuable standards."o
Parties bargain to advance their self-interest within established legal
standards. They consider conflicting social welfare goals like avoiding
hold-up only if an enforceable legal rule requires them to do so. Conse-
quently, it is the legal definition of RAND that Judge Robart articulated that
matters, not any imaginary public-spirited bargain. Despite Judge Robart's
recurrent references to hypothetical negotiations, he calculated a range of
RAND rates by evaluating the evidence, choosing benchmarks, and making
assumptions consistent with the twin imperatives of avoiding hold-up and
royalty stacking. 61 For example, in considering comparable royalties, he
identified two patent pools, one for each standard, as appropriate bench-
marks in the RAND context because they were likely to point to rates that
avoided hold-up and stacking. 62 Even though SSOs do not (yet) require SEP
owners to participate in pools, the RAND commitment is designed to ac-
complish goals similar to those ofpools. 63 The court's selection and modifi-
cation of the pools indicates the court's recognition of these efficiency con-
cerns.
B. Applying the Measures
This section describes how Judge Robart calculated RAND royalties in
Microsoft, emphasizing how he applied the economic standard for RAND to
the circumstances of the case. Although he was limited by gaps in the rec-
ord, he tried repeatedly to identify specific values that reflected the standard
of economic welfare.
5 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *71 (concluding that some royalties were not clearly
subject to a RAND obligation). Some of the negotiated rates were unreliable because
the parties were in the process of settling other litigation. VTech, for example, agreed to
a rate of 2.25% for the 802.11 and H.264 SEPs under threat of pending litigation, in
which liability for other infringements was the determining factor. Id at *67. RIM also
negotiated its license of SEPs in the 802.11 and H.264 standards as part of a settlement
of other infringement litigation as part of a bundle of Motorola's cellular technology, so
it was impossible to isolate the amounts paid just for 802.11 and H.264. Id. at *68-70.
Moreover, the rates did not apply to all of RIM's products. Id.
60 Id. at *20.
61 Judge Holderman made a similar calculation of the RAND royalties for Innovatio's
SEPs for the 802.11 standard, basing the estimate on a share of the average profit on a
Wi-Fi chip. In re Innovatio IP Ventures LLC Patent Litig., No. 1 1-C-9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *38-43 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
62 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20.
63 Contreras, supra note 23, at 75-78.
192 [Vol. 22:181
Judging Monopolistic Pricing
1. The H.264 Standard
To set the stage, Judge Robart described the development of video
compression, the history of the standard, and the different types of compres-
sion within the H.264 standard.' For example, he distinguished compres-
sion of now-obsolete interlaced video from compression of more advanced
and widely used progressive video.6 ' He also considered the quantity and
quality of Motorola's SEPs, relying on expert testimony from both sides.
Of the more than 2,500 patents essential to the H.264 standard, he observed
that Motorola had sixteen, divided into six families, 67 all of which were of
limited value to Microsoft for various reasons. One family, for example,
was limited to hardware implementations of the H.264 standard.6 ' All were
limited mainly to interlaced video6 9 that Microsoft's products, particularly
Windows and Xbox, do not support.70 Most important, some were of dimin-
ished value in the RAND context because there were alternatives to them
prior to the development of the H.264 standard-a direct comparison to ex
ante royalties in calculating RAND royalties.7 ' The court discounted testi-
mony that failed to isolate the importance of Motorola's SEPs to Microsoft's
products from the importance of the H.264 standard to those products.72
In determining RAND royalties, Judge Robart looked primarily to com-
parables. 73 In doing so, he rejected using royalties that Motorola had negoti-
ated in real bilateral negotiations as benchmarks, 74 even though these kinds
of royalties are highly probative in ordinary patent infringement litigation
applying the Georgia-Pacific factors. In the RAND context, Judge Robart
reasoned that royalties negotiated for patents that were not subject to a
" Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *21-26.
6 Id. at *21-22.
16 Id. at *30.
67 Id. at *27.
68 Id.
69 Id. at *30-31.
70 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *43. The court concluded that Motorola's SEPs for the
H.264 standard were of "only minor importance to the overall functionality" of Win-
dows and Xbox. Id. at *47-48.
n Id. at *36, *42. For example, the court examined Motorola's "paired macroblock
MBAFF" prediction technique, finding that it added value to the standard, but noting
that it was not proven to be superior to the alternative single macroblock MBAFF. Id. at
*33-36. It similarly determined that Motorola's PAFF family of patents added value to
the standard relative to alternatives, but the value was limited because it only applied to
interlaced video. Id. at *39. As to the Scan family of patents, the court noted the ab-
sence of "concrete evidence . .. as to why the suggested alternatives could not have been
incorporated into the H.264 Standard without degradation." Id. at *42.
72 Id. at *44.
" Id. at *64.
74 Id. at *66-70 (finding the following not comparable: (1) a 2.25% royalty for Motorola's
802.11 and H.264 SEPs negotiated in a settlement to infringement litigation involving
other patents not subject to a RAND commitment and (2) a royalty that covered patents
in addition to Motorola's 802.11 and H.264 SEPs).
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RAND commitment, or that were subject to contaminating influences, were
irrelevant." Instead, Judge Robart used royalties established by the MPEG
H.264 patent pool (in a process that did not involve bilateral negotiations at
all) as a benchmark.7 6 The pool covers over 2,400 patents, with royalties
ranging from ten cents and twenty cents per unit of the licensee's sales, de-
pending on the licensee's volume, with an annual cap of five million dol-
lars.n Microsoft argued that the pool was particularly relevant because the
owners of MPEG H.264 SEPs, including both Microsoft and Motorola," es-
tablished the pool shortly after the adoption of the standard, so the royalties
it set were estimates by the owners (including Motorola) of the ex ante value
of the patents themselves. 9
Judge Robart agreed, with two qualifications. First, the pool rates may
be lower than would be expected in a bilateral negotiation, even under a
RAND commitment, because they distribute royalties based on the absolute
number of patents in a portfolio rather than their relative importance to the
standard." This qualification recognized the contingent value of the patent
to the standard mentioned earlier. Second, SEP owners that join a pool re-
ceive not only royalties, but also the value of access to other patents in the
pool."' Nevertheless, Judge Robart concluded that the pool rate provided a
good starting point for estimating a lower bound of the RAND rate because
the pool's pricing goals were consistent with the purpose of fostering wide-
spread implementation of the standard 8 2 -the pool rate is set high enough to
attract SEP owners (including Motorola's parent company, Google) but low
enough to attract licensees.83
The court found that Motorola should receive "royalties equivalent to
what it would have received if it and the other holders of other readily iden-
tifiable H.264 SEPs were all added to the pool with the current pool rate
structure." 84 That standard took into account all of Motorola's SEPs as well
7 Id
76 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *82.
* Id. at *78-79.
7 Id. *75.
79 Id. at *79. For a discussion of similarities between SSOs and pools, see Lerner &
Tirole, supra note 24, at 5.
8o Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *80. Judge Robart adopted an incremental measure in
his modification of Georgia-Pacific. Id. He also expressed concern that, if he simply
adopted the pool rate as the RAND rate, owners of important SEPs would be less likely
to participate in pools. Id. For a discussion of why pools often assign patents equal
weight in distributing royalties, see Lerner & Tirole, supra note 24, at 20-21 ("[E]xcept
for those patents that are constained [sic] by within-functionality substitution, all patents
are equal once they have been made essential by the standard setter.").
8 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *81.
82 Id. at *82.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *84 (considering three scenarios for calculating RAND royalties and selecting the
second).
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as eighty-nine others not currently in the pool." Under this formula, Mi-
crosoft would owe Motorola its share of the pool royalties, or 0.185 cents
per unit, plus the value that Motorola would gain by having access to the
other technology in the patent pool." The court estimated the latter amount
to be twice the pool royalty because Microsoft pays into the pool as a licen-
see about twice what it receives in royalties from the pool as a licensor and
would only do that if the value of access to pool patents was worth the dif-
ference." Judge Robart also found that Motorola's parent company, Google,
is comparable to Microsoft in ways relevant to the calculation." Therefore,
the lower bound of the RAND royalty Microsoft would owe Motorola was
three times Motorola's share of the pool royalties-still a fraction of a cent
per unit. Judge Robart explained his derivation of this formula much more
fully in a remarkable 1,500-word footnote, consisting of an algebraic state-
ment and solution of the problem of isolating the lower bound of a RAND
rate." Critical assumptions in this calculation were, first, that Motorola's
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *84.
88 See id. ("Microsoft and Google are similarly situated as sophisticated, substantial tech-
nology firms with vast arrays of technologically complex products.").
81 Id. at *85 n.23. Judge Robart reasoned that the value of joining a pool, VP, was equal to
the benefits of joining the pool less the costs. Id. On the plus side of VP, he added the
royalties the patent owner would receive for its patents in the pool (P,), the value of the
owner's IP rights to pool patents (IP), and the "external value the company derives from
adding its patents to the pool, such as promoting participation in the pool and thereby
encouraging widespread adoption of the standard" (E), assuming that the pool patents
were all licensed at the same rate. Id. On the minus side, he identified the royalties the
owner pays for pool patents (P) and the opportunity cost associated with not licensing
its patents outside the pool (OC). Id. The value of abstaining from the pool, VA, was
parallel to the VP formula. Id. On the plus side, VA consisted of the RAND royalties
the owner could collect for its patents outside the pool (A)-this figure, of course, was
the RAND rate that the court was trying to determine-and the value of the IP rights to
pool patents that the owner presumably would acquire to practice the standard. Id. On
the minus side were the cost of acquiring those rights (A) and the opportunity cost asso-
ciated with not joining the pool. Id. He noted that the IP value of the pool patents is on
both sides of the equation, so he cancelled it out. Id. The court reasoned that a company
that owned unusually important patents might find it more valuable to abstain from the
pool, while one with less valuable patents might gain by joining the pool. Id. It as-
sumed, however, that Motorola's patents were of average value relative to the pool, so it
did not have to include a coefficient to adjust for any such disparity. Id. This step al-
lowed the court to find that for Motorola, VP was equal to VA. Id. There was an equiva-
lent OC value on each side of the equation, so they canceled out. Id. Microsoft's inter-
nal documents suggested that E was its primary reason for participating. Id. In fact,
Microsoft paid twice as much in royalties into to the H.264 pool as it received (P =
2P,), yet it still participated in the pool, so E must have offset this deficit to make VP
greater than zero. Id. For that to occur, E would have to be at least equal to P, (0 < VP
= P, - P. + E = P. - 2P+ + E = E - P.), so the court assumed that they were equal, both
for Microsoft and Google. Id. Finally, the court noted that the value to SEP owners of
abstaining from participation in a pool is the difference between what it would receive
by charging RAND royalties (A+, the variable at issue in the case) and the amount it
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patents were of average value and, second, that Motorola, if it remained out-
side the pool, would have to pay in royalties 1.5 times what it would pay in
royalties as a member of the pool.
That calculation established the lower bound of the RAND range. To
establish the upper bound, Judge Robart suggested that a hypothetical licen-
see would calculate the most it could pay for all H.264 SEPs and still have a
profitable business.90 The starting point for calculating that amount, he de-
termined, would be "the aggregate licensing fee of all essential patents cali-
brated against the principle that license fees should not be stacked in such a
way that makes implementation of the standard prohibitively expensive."9 1
In this passage, Judge Robart recognized that even the upper bound for roy-
alties under a RAND commitment required internalizing the Cournot com-
plements problem by hypothesizing a blanket license of SEPs. The court
concluded the maximum blanket royalty would be $1.50 per unit because
that was the figure proposed during the initial negotiation of the H.264 pa-
tent pool. 92 Motorola's share of that amount, based on the number of patents
in the pool, was about a nickel per unit.93 The upper bound of the RAND
range would be three times that, again to account for the value of access to
other patents in the pool. 94
2. The 802.11 Standard
As with the H.264 standard, Judge Robart began his calculation of
RAND rates for Motorola's SEPs in the 802.11 standard for Wi-Fi by exam-
ining the technology underlying the standard and identifying its core ena-
bling features.9 5  Although "the majority of the technologies available to
and/or adopted by the 802.11 drafters were in the public domain and not
covered by patents,"96 many companies have asserted that they own patents
would have to pay for licenses to patents in the pool (A-). Id. Because the court con-
cluded that the values of participating and abstaining from the pool must be equal both
to each other and (netting benefits and costs) to zero for patents of average value like
Motorola's, then A, must be equal to A. (VA = 0 = A, - A., so A, = A.). Id. Consequent-
ly, all that remained was for the court to determine A_. Id. Unfortunately, there was no
evidence of this value, so Judge Robart guessed it would be 1.5 times P.. Id. He
thought it would be higher than the pool rate "but not twice as high because some, if not
all, of the companies holding SEPs would be subject to the RAND commitment." Id. It
would therefore also be equal to three times P,. Id. This figure was appropriate as a
lower bound of the RAND royalty, despite the fact that the pool distributed royalties
based only on the number rather than the importance of patents in the portfolio, because
Motorola's SEPs only cover relatively unimportant obsolete technology.
90 Id. at *86.
91 Id.
92 Id. at *87.
9 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *87.
94 id
9 Id. at *51 (naming network setup, channel access management, data modulation, and
security encryption as core enabling features).
9 Id. at *50.
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essential to the standard.9 7 Motorola claimed to hold twenty-four such pa-
tents, but it provided little evidence that its patents were actually SEPs for
the 802.11 standard." According to the court, this lowered their value be-
cause it made it less likely that Microsoft actually used them.99 The only
Microsoft product that uses Motorola's patents under this standard is the
Xbox, and it only uses eleven of the twenty-four, so only those eleven were
relevant to the calculation.o As with Motorola's SEPs for the H.264 stand-
ard, the court found that Motorola's SEPs for the 802.11 standard were of
limited value to Microsoft because of functional limitations and uncertain-
ties about their importance to the standard or the Xbox.' 0
The court considered three benchmarks in determining a range of
RAND royalties for SEPs in the 802.11 standard. First, it looked to the Via
802.11 patent pool even though, unlike the MPEG H.264 pool, it was estab-
lished several years after adoption of the standard and had only a handful of
SEP holders and licensees as participants.102 The Via pool had denied
Motorola access because. its evaluator determined that Motorola's patents
were not essential to the standard.' Nevertheless, Judge Robart found that
the Via pool provided a decent benchmark for an upper bound to the range
of RAND royalties because it focused directly on the 802.11 standard and
set its rates, albeit unsuccessfully, in order to promote widespread adop-
tion.'"
The court had the benefit of expert testimony for this calculation, but
the experts had based their calculations on the 183 patents that Motorola had
claimed as essential to the 802.11 standard, not the eleven that it ultimately
litigated.' Consequently, the court recalculated the relative value of the
eleven patents, assuming they were in the Via patent pool. 1 6 Following the
experts' methodologies, the court found that Motorola's patents would ac-
count for about 10% of the patent pool royalty revenue.'o7 Applying this
percentage to the royalty revenue, Microsoft would have paid to the Via pa-
tent pool a royalty of about two cents per unit, or just under $300,000.'10 As
in its treatment of the MPEG pool, the court accounted for the value of ac-
cess to other patents in the pool by tripling the per-unit price to six cents per
9 Id. at *52.
98 Id. at *53.
9 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *53.
10 Id. at *55.
1o1 See id. at *55-4 (examining the role of the patents and their value to Microsoft in
channel access, data modulation, network setup, and security).
102 Id. at *87, *89.
103 Id. at *88.
'04 Id. at *89.
os Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *90.
106 Id.
107 Id. at *91.
108 id
2014] 197
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
unit as the upper bound of a RAND royalty.'" This was the upper bound of
the RAND royalty rate for three reasons: the Via pool did not include all
SEP holders, there was no evidence that any of Motorola's patents were any
more or less valuable than any other SEPs, and Motorola's contribution to
the standard as a whole was relatively small, especially for Microsoft."o
The second benchmark the court considered was the royalty that Mar-
vell Semiconductor Inc. (Marvel), a chipset manufacturer, paid for SEPs
within the 802.11 standard."' Microsoft, among many other companies,
buys Wi-Fi chipsets from Marvell for about $3.00 per unit in order to assure
Wi-Fi functionality in its products-in Microsoft's case, the Xbox." 2 Mar-
vell pays a royalty of 1% of the price of its chipsets, or about three cents, to
ARM Holdings both for use of the SEPs to build its chips and for the in-
structions to developers that use the chips." 3 In part because of fears of roy-
alty stacking, this figure is viewed as the ceiling for the semiconductor in-
dustry, which the court found was analogous to the video games used with
the Xbox." 4
The last benchmark the court considered was a study by InteCap, a con-
sulting firm that evaluated Motorola's 802.11 portfolio in 2003."s That
study proposed a tiered pricing strategy under which chipset designers
would pay one royalty, and manufacturers of 802.11-enabled end products,
such as video games, would pay another."' The court found these rates to
be relevant because InteCap accounted for royalty stacking and the relative
values of the finished products."' InteCap recommended that makers of fin-
ished goods like the Xbox pay 0.1%, or between twenty and forty cents, per
device sold."' This amount assumed that Motorola SEPs contributed a quar-
ter of the functionality of the 802.11 standard."' Because the evidence
showed Motorola's real contribution was closer to 1%, the court reduced the
InteCap royalty by a factor of twenty-five, to between .8 and 1.6 cents per
unit.120
Judge Robart found some confirmation of the validity of his three
RAND benchmarks in their proximity to one another and in the fact that
their average of 3.47 cents per unit was close to all of them.12' He then cal-
10 Id.
"o Id. at *92.
"' Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *93.
1 1 2 Id.
" Id. at *94.
114 See id (concluding that a 1% royalty rate was reasonable).
"' Id. at *95.
116 Id.
11 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *96-97.
"1 Id. at *98.
"' Id. at *96.
120 Id. at *98.
121 Id. at *99 (averaging the three benchmarks of .8, 3.5, and 6.114).
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culated the upper bound of the RAND range at 19.5 cents per unit.122 Mi
crosoft had originally suggested a royalty of 6.5 cents, which it based on the
assumption that Motorola was a member of the Via patent pool.123 Judge
Robart tripled this figure, as with the H.264 standard, to account for the val-
ue of access to other patents in the pool. 124 He found insufficient evidence to
estimate a lower bound, so he simply chose .8 cents per unit, the lowest fig-
ure in his adjusted InteCap analysis. 125
IV. RAND and Optimal Penalties
A collectively-established standard is exclusive, conferring market
power on the patents essential to it. The RAND commitment limits the
owners of those patents to the royalties they could have commanded before
the patents became essential to the standard. It thus prohibits SEP owners
from exploiting the standard's enhancement of their monopoly power, either
by holding up licensees or stacking royalties. In Microsoft, Judge Robart
implemented this conception of the RAND commitment by calculating rates
based on benchmark royalties untainted by hold-up or stacking. Although
Microsoft never actually paid the royalties Motorola demanded, the over-
charge those royalties represented relative to RAND rates was central to the
breach of contract claim. Judge Robart instructed the jury that it could
"compare Motorola's offers against the RAND royalty rate and range deter-
mined by the court" in determining whether Motorola breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing.126
122 Id. at *100.
123 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *100.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *101. Judge Holderman's estimated royalty for Innovatio's 802.11 SEPs was
comparable. In re Innovatio IP Ventures LLC Patent Litig., No. 11-C-9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). Because he found that Innovatio's nineteen pa-
tents were all very important to the Wi-Fi standard, he concluded that they were in the
top 10% of an estimated three thousand or so Wi-Fi SEPs. Id. at *43. The three hun-
dred patents in the top 10% likely accounted for 84% of the average profit on a Wi-Fi
chip. Id. Innovatio's royalty was thus 19/300 of 84%, or 9.56 cents-"the pro rata share
of the value in the top 10% of all 802.11 standard-essential patents attributable to Inno-
vatio's nineteen-patent portfolio." Id. This royalty was approximately three times Judge
Robart's estimated average royalty, but the difference was appropriate because Innova-
tio's patents were far more important to the Wi-Fi standard than Motorola's were. Id. at
*44.
126 Jury Instructions 19, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL
5397931 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2013). The damages Microsoft sought in the contract ac-
tion were for expenses it incurred because of Motorola's efforts to seek injunctive relief
from the International Trade Commission and in courts in the United States and Europe
in violation of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under the RAND commitment. Id.
24.
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The court's analysis in determining the RAND rate was similar in struc-
ture and purpose to the measurement of an antitrust injury. Antitrust courts
estimate a monopolistic overcharge when they assess damages for price fix-
ing or anticompetitive exclusion, comparing a defendant's actual price with
the price in a counterfactual or but-for world in which the violation did not
occur.127 The overcharge from price fixing is antitrust injury because it
measures individual harm causally linked to a collusive output restriction
and corresponding welfare loss.'28 Similarly, if a dominant firm were to ex-
clude a fringe of smaller rivals by nakedly exclusionary contracts with input
suppliers, the difference between the dominant firm price and the monopoly
price would be an illegal overcharge.12 9 In the accompanying diagram, if the
127 Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 423, 429 (1995).
128 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (discussing Sherman Act
provisions that protect against price fixing).
129 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft
Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829, 833 (2001) ("Exclusionary practices can also im-
pose antitrust injury if, for example, they succeed in reducing output and increasing
prices to consumers, either by raising the costs of rivals or by driving them from the
market entirely."); William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Inju-
ry, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2151, 2156 (1990); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for
Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1474-75 (1985); cf In re Neurontin Anti-
trust Litig., MDL No. 1479, 2009 WL 2751029, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009) (hold-
ing that alleged overcharges to direct purchasers of prescription drugs because of mo-
nopolistic conduct aimed at excluding generic competition was antitrust injury). For
200 [Vol. 22:181
Judging Monopolistic Pricing
dominant firm illegally excluded the fringe output (S), it would have a mo-
nopoly not on the residual demand (Dd), but the entire market demand (D).
The overcharge would be the difference between the corresponding profit-
maximizing prices Pm and Pd. This difference between the monopoly and
dominant firm prices would represent antitrust injury to purchasers because
it would be directly proportional to the inefficiency that the offense creat-
ed-a larger deadweight welfare loss attributable to a greater output re-
striction (from q, to qd) and a higher price.' To estimate the actual over-
charge in litigation, courts would rely on economic experts to project the
but-for world based on a competitive benchmark, which might be prices be-
fore or after the violation or prices in a comparable market (a yardstick
measurement) in which no violation occurred."3 ' Courts have developed
widely accepted standards for evaluating the reliability of expert testimony
in making these sorts of projections.'32
Calculating hold-up that violates a RAND commitment is comparable
in theory and practice to calculating an overcharge attributable to monopo-
listic exclusion.'3 3 When an SSO writes a patent into a standard, it excludes
the owner's rivals in much the same way that a monopolistic practice ex-
fuller discussion of antitrust injury, see William H. Page, The Chicago School and the
Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency,
75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1268-78 (1989) (discussing antitrust policy, rules, and models)
and William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to An-
titrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 472 (1980) (considering the impact of damages on
anticompetitive conduct).
13 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965) (holding that a firm may monopolize by acquiring a patent through fraud on the
patent office). If the patent enhances the firm's monopoly power by excluding rivals,
the resulting overcharge imposes antitrust injury on consumers. Christopher R. Leslie,
The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 281,
289-95 (2007). A circuit court held that deceptive nondisclosure of patents on technol-
ogy before an SSO was not an antitrust violation if it did not actually cause the SSO to
standardize the technology. Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 466-67
(D.C. Cir. 2008). If it only allowed the SEP owner to avoid a RAND commitment, it did
not impose antitrust injury. Id. For criticism of Rambus on the issue of causation, see
Michael A. Carrier, A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust Analysis, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 991, 1013-15 (2011) and Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Anti-
trust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 722 (2009). In the analogy
proposed in the text, the firm's conduct does create additional monopoly power.
'.' See PETER DAVIS & ELIANA GARCts, QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COMPETITION
AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 352-64 (2010) (discussing methods of quantifying damages
based on but-for analysis).
132 See generally Robert Kneuper & James Langenfeld, The Potential Role of Civil Antitrust
Damage Analysis in Determining Financial Penalties in Criminal Antitrust Cases, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 953, 964-80 (2011) (summarizing techniques that economic ex-
pert witnesses use in estimating antitrust overcharges).
" William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652,
669 (1983); see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968) (discussing generally the distortion of resource allocation
due to monopolistic exclusion).
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cludes fringe firms.'3 4 Adoption of a standard by itself does not ordinarily
violate the antitrust laws because, on balance, it is likely to increase efficien-
cy by facilitating interoperability and innovation. However, the RAND
commitment, or some other effective price constraint, is integral to this bal-
ance. If the owner departs from its RAND commitment, it reduces efficien-
cy by exploiting the monopoly power the standard creates to charge a royal-
ty above what it could have charged ex ante in competition with non-
compliant rivals. The resulting hold-up is analogous to an overcharge by a
firm that acquired monopoly power by exclusionary conduct.
Because the ex ante royalty is for a patented product, it may itself re-
flect a degree of monopoly power comparable to the position of the domi-
nant firm in the foregoing diagram. If the SEP owner acquired its patent
lawfully, the monopoly power attributable to the patent is lawful."' If, how-
ever, an SSO were to establish a standard that conferred monopoly power on
SEP owners without a price constraint, it would likely violate the antitrust
laws and be liable for treble damages for any overcharges. It follows that if
SEP owners ignore a RAND price constraint and set royalties that reflects
monopoly power conferred by the standard, the difference is tantamount to
an illegal overcharge.
Part of the ability of SEP owners to hold up licensees reflects ex post
opportunism-exploitation of firms that have made technology-specific in-
vestments in the standard. Nevertheless, hold-up in this instance is also
comparable to antitrust injury. In Image Technical,36 the Supreme Court
mistook Kodak's ex post exploitation of the buyers of its durable goods for
true market power.'3 7 Because Kodak faced competition in the product mar-
ket for its copiers, its ability to hold up customers in its aftermarket was only
134 See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) ("When
a patented technology is incorporated in a standard, adoption of the standard eliminates
alternatives to the patented technology."); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) ("Agreement on a product standard is ... implicitly an
agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products."). For
discussion of the damage model used by the excluded rival in Indian Head, see
ANTITRUST DAMAGES PROJECT COMM., AM. BAR. AsS'N., PROVING ANTITRUST
DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 226-29 (William H. Page ed., 1996). For dis-
cussion of the exclusionary potential of standard-setting, see Richard Gilbert, Competi-
tion Policy for Industry Standards, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-19), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 040&context-richardgilbert.
.' Leslie, supra note 130, at 283. The ex ante royalties may themselves represent an over-
charge if the patent was acquired by fraud. Id. at 289-95.
136 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
'. See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 43, 57-58 (1993) (stating that the assessment of market power and the
risk of hold-up must be evaluated as of a time before the customer made seller-specific
investments).
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contractual and not a matter of antitrust concern."' Standard-setting, how-
ever, entails the joint action of rivals that creates market power for SEPs.
Firms that adopt the standard are not in privity with the SEP owner and
therefore cannot protect themselves contractually by anticipating future
hold-up. Thus, exploitation of their sunk investments in the standard is mo-
nopolistic and would reflect antitrust injury in the absence of an effective
RAND commitment or other price constraint.
The ex ante standard, if used as a practical benchmark, would replicate
a before-and-after model of antitrust damages-the extent of the overcharge
is the difference between prices during the offense and the prices that would
have prevailed if conditions before had continued."' In some circumstances,
the court might look to a different yardstick for a RAND price, one unaffect-
ed by hold-up. Judge Robart adopted essentially this latter strategy by look-
ing to the patent pools as a starting point for estimation of ex ante royalties.
The H.264 pool was a closer fit because SEP owners formed it in the wake
of the standard's adoption. Even in that instance, of course, the court recog-
nized the need to expand the pool to include all essential patents and to ad-
just the pool royalty-a need that might be still greater if the relevant SEP
had extraordinary value ex ante. Legally enforcing the RAND commitment
can eliminate a deadweight loss and enhance social welfare if it can be done
with reasonable accuracy, without unnecessary speculation, and at a reason-
able cost.
Using RAND commitments to control royalty stacking is also compara-
ble to the assessment of antitrust damages. Royalty stacking is a form of
double marginalization or compounding monopolies. The following dia-
gram illustrates the problem of double marginalization in a closely related
vertical context. Assume that good A is an input for the production of good
B. The marginal cost of producing A is MCA, and the marginal cost of pro-
ducing B is MCB. MCB, apart from the cost of A, is zero, so MCA MCB. If
one producer controls production of both A and B, the demand for the down-
stream product, B, and the marginal cost of producing B would determine
the profit-maximizing price. The producer would equate the marginal reve-
nue from B (MRB) with MCB at an output of qi, which corresponds to a price
ofp; on DB.
Now suppose different monopolists control the production of A and B.
In that case, the B monopolist's demand for A, or DA, would be the marginal
value of A to it at each output level, or simply MRB, which reflects the addi-
tion to total revenue from the sale of an incremental unit of B, given DB.
The A monopolist would construct its MRA, the marginal revenue curve, cor-
13 See id at 50-58 (stating that if consumers know about a restrictive service policy at the
time of purchasing the equipment, hold-up is not an issue because the consumers will
contract for the protection they want).
"3 See Blair & Page, supra note 127, at 443-50 (explaining the before-and-after model).
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responding to DA. It would set its output where MRA is equal to MCA. The
resulting output, q2, of both A and B would be lower than under an integrated
monopoly. The price of A alone would be p;; the corresponding price of B,
P2, would be higher than under an integrated monopoly.
$
p2
MCA= MCB
q2 qi Q
The Coumot complements problem presents an analogous form of dou-
ble marginalization by rival monopoly suppliers of complements to the same
purchasers. Because each firm separately charges a monopoly price, the
monopolies compound and the output in the market is lower and the price
higher than if a single monopolist produced the goods as a bundle.140 Lem-
ley and Shapiro show that if an implementer faces linear demand and con-
stant marginal cost, its output would be twice as high if a monopolist or joint
venture of three SEPs charged a single royalty for all of the products than if
three separate patent owners charged individual monopoly royalties.141
The Cournot complements problem arises only if goods are strongly
complementary and have few substitutes. Standardization, if successful, re-
duces the availability of substitutes and increases the degree of complemen-
tarity among products within the standard. It excludes rivals and thus in-
creases the degree of monopoly power held by SEP owners, thus
aggravating potential Cournot complements problems. Although the SSO
generally focuses on technology rather than specific licensing terms,14 2 it
imposes a RAND commitment to foster efficient royalties for all patents
made essential by the process by internalizing the externalities in pricing of
140 For a mathematical proof, see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2046-48.
141 Id. at 2014.
142 Lemley, supra note 31, at 1951.
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SEPs that are Cournot complements.143 For similar reasons, antitrust author-
ities have recognized the Coumot complements problem as a justification for
pooling complementary patents.'" If the SSO imposed no pricing con-
straint, it would likely violate the antitrust laws, and royalty stacking by its
members would be an illegal overcharge.
Royalty stacking contradicts the goal of the RAND commitment to fos-
ter widespread adoption of the standard. For SEP owners to charge their in-
dividual monopoly, royalty rate would represent an overcharge relative to
the royalty charged by a joint venture or pool of firms that participated in the
standard. Indeed, some observers have recently suggested that "SSO[s]
might sponsor or otherwise facilitate formation of a patent pool . .. [or] re-
quire ex ante disclosures from patent holders of whether they will participate
in a patent pool (and which one)." 45 Even if the SSO does not actually form
a pool or require SEP owners to participate in one, the RAND royalty should
be calculated to avoid the market failures that a pool would address.
Again, the difference between the actual price under royalty stacking
and the but-for price that avoids royalty stacking is analogous to antitrust in-
jury. The but-for world is one in which royalties for patents do not reflect
stacking attributable to the increased monopoly power and greater comple-
mentarity that the standard confers. Presumably, the RAND commitment
would not prohibit stacking of royalties to the extent that it reflected only the
degree of complementarity and monopoly power the SEPs possessed before
becoming essential to a standard.'4 6
Judge Robart's calculation of RAND royalties by reference to patent
pools was consistent with this approach to concerns about royalty stacking.
For the H.264 pool, in calculating the lower bound of a RAND rate for roy-
alties of average value like Motorola's, he looked to a multiple of the actual
rates charged by the pool. For the upper bound, he estimated Motorola's
proportional share of "the aggregate licensing fee of all essential patents cal-
14 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Steven C. Salop, Competition and Integration Among
Complements, and Network Market Structure, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 105, 108-09 (1992)
(explaining Cournot complements).
'4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf ("Cross-licensing and pooling ar-
rangements ... may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary
technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly
infringement litigation."); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of
Technology, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1119, 1129 (2012) ("Pooling of complementary
patents can also address double marginalization problems when licenses must otherwise
be obtained from separate sources.").
1 Michael A. Lindsay & Robert A. Skitol, New Dimensions to the Patent Holdup Saga, 27
ANTITRUST 34, 39 (2013).
146 Judge Robart evidently saw no need to make this distinction, perhaps because
Motorola's patents only contributed to stacking ex post.
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ibrated against the principle that license fees should not be stacked in such a
way that makes implementation of the standard prohibitively expensive."' 4 7
In essence, this amount reflected projection of a monopoly price charged by
a single pricing entity that controlled all essential and complementary pa-
tents in the standard.
V. Breach of the RAND Commitment as an Antitrust Violation
The argument so far analogizes the calculation of RAND rates to the
measure of antitrust injury-charging excess royalties is comparable to an
overcharge attributable to anticompetitive exclusion. One might reasonably
ask whether a breach of the RAND commitment should more properly be
viewed as an antitrust violation compensable by antitrust damages. Joseph
Kattan has argued as much.148 He notes that the inclusion of a patent in a
standard accompanied by a RAND commitment excludes the next-best al-
ternative technology, but only through competition on the merits before the
SSO and a voluntary eschewal of monopoly power by the winning technolo-
gy.149 Later breach of the RAND commitment makes the initial exclusion
anticompetitive, much as recoupment of losses during a period of below-cost
pricing completes the offense of predatory pricing.'
If this presentation of the relationship between the RAND commitment
and antitrust injury is correct, it should typically be unnecessary to extend
antitrust liability to these circumstances. The contractual RAND commit-
ment, if effective, limits monopoly power in the same way as a long-term
supply contract with an enforceable price term. The Supreme Court held in
General Dynamics that a merger of coal producers could not reduce compe-
tition because the acquired firm had formed long-term contractual commit-
ments to supply their available reserves at specified prices.'' In other
words, enforcement of those contracts would prevent any anticompetitive
behavior by the merging coal producers. Similarly, the enforcement of the
contractual commitments in standard-setting is the most direct and effective
method of vindicating the interests of competition.
Another analogy might be Trinko, in which the Supreme Court declined
to extend liability under the Sherman Act to include Verizon's failure to
share its network elements with competitive carriers.'5 2 In doing so, the
Court described the comprehensive regulatory scheme within which the
147 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIO-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *86 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
148 Kattan, supra note 20, at 32-34.
149 Id. at 33-34.
1o Id.
"' United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 502-03, 506 (1974).
152 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415
(2004).
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FCC policed incumbent carriers' sharing obligations... and concluded that
"the regime was an effective steward of the antitrust function."15 4 Granted,
the Court in Trinko compared judicial and administrative supervision of a
sharing obligation," while in the RAND setting the choice is between alter-
native judicial mechanisms-contract or antitrust litigation. Nevertheless,
the contractual obligation is the critical limit on monopoly power. Breach of
that obligation is the lynchpin of any anticompetitive effect. Before exten-
sion of Sherman Act liability, there should be a clear showing that enforce-
ment of the contractual commitment is insufficient to protect the antitrust in-
terest.
VI. Conclusion
Although Judge Robart's hypothetical bargaining was mainly window
dressing for his reasoning, the substance of the opinion will likely have im-
portant effects on real-world bargaining. Bargaining occurs, as the well-
worn metaphor puts it, in the shadow of the law that courts create.156 i a re-
al-world bilateral negotiation, parties take positions that account for legal
constraints, anticipating the likely outcome should the dispute reach the
courts.157 Judge Robart's opinion exposes a range of formidable practical
challenges to the calculation of RAND price. At the same time, it provides
some evidence of the law for future negotiations by defining the permissible
benchmarks for the identification of a reasonable price.
We can understand Judge Robart's analysis better by comparing it to
the principle and practice of antitrust injury for antitrust violations. The an-
titrust injury doctrine links antitrust remedies to the theory of optimal penal-
ties by requiring that compensable damages be causally related to the output
restriction associated with an offense, either collusive or exclusionary. The
RAND commitment serves a similar function, even in cases in which the
SEP owner has not violated the antitrust laws. It limits the SEP owner to a
but-for royalty that reflects neither hold-up nor royalty stacking. That is, the
SEP owner is limited to royalties that reflect the ex ante value of its intellec-
tual property, not the incremental monopoly power that the standard pro-
vides or the risk of double marginalization from individual monopoly pric-
ing, a risk that the standard might actually enhance by fostering greater
complementarity.
'" Id. at 412-13.
154 Id. at 413.
" Id. at 414-15.
156 Michel, supra note 37, at 893; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
157 Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897)
("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law.").
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Judge Robart's reliance on an inclusive patent pool formed near the
adoption of a standard as a benchmark captured both of these theoretical cri-
teria for a RAND price. He justified the use of the pools specifically be-
cause their prices directly reflected the participants' efforts to avoid hold-up
and stacking. A patent pool represents an attempt to implement ex post the
goals of the SSO. Equally important, he modified the royalties charged by
the pools by assuming that the pools included all of the relevant SEPs.
These became his yardsticks and he used their royalty rates to project a but-
for world in which an individual owner of Motorola's SEPs charged RAND
royalties.
